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Article 7

Book Reviews

Waking Giants: Modernism and the Presence of the Past, by Herbert N. Schneidau. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Pp. 279. $34.50.
Do you want to waste your best energies in this eternal and useless
admiration of the past, from which you issue fatally exhausted, diminished, and downtrodden? ... but we don't want to hear anything more
about it, the past-we strong and youthful futurists!
F. T. Marinetti, "First Manifesto of Futurism" (1909)
J'aime une oeuvre ancienne pour sa nouveaute. II n'y a que Ie contraste
qui nous relie au passe.
Tristan Tzara, "Manifeste Dada 1918"
"Make it new," intoned Ezra Pound, issuing what is perhaps the best remembered imperative of the historical avant-garde. "Une grande epoque
vient de commencer," declared the authors of the 1920 manifesto-they were
Le Corbusier, the painter Amedee Ozenfant, and the poet Paul Derme-that
introduced the first number of L'Esprit Nouveau. "New" and "nouveau": such
words evoke our typical impression of the break constituted by cultural modernism, the sense that modernism marked an unprecedented departure from
the past which permanently altered the vocabulary of the arts in Euro-American culture. Yet it has hardly gone unremarked that modernism was also
deeply responsive to the past's allure. When Pound tried to find a figure for
his effort to create a modern epic in The Cantos, he chose Odysseus as portrayed in the Nekuia from Book 11 of The Odyssey, the descent to the underworld, choosing this episode becuase it was patently "older than the rest" of
Homer's work: it was the oldest part of the oldest work in Western literature.
And when Le Corbusier gathered essays from L'Esprit Nouveau to layout a
systematic program of modern design, Vers une architecture (1923), he closed
the book with a section of photographs depicting the Acropolis of Periclean
Athens, an image whose power was only augmented by appearing after a series of sleek ships, shiny automobiles, and powerful aircraft: the new beauty
created by the machine age, such a sequence said, would lead us not forward, but backward to the foundational monument of Western architecture.
Though Herbert N. Schneidau's new book, Waking Giants: The Presence of
the Past in Modernism, invokes this essential paradox of modernism in its title, the subject itself receives rather limited treatment. "I do not propose to
offer a 'theory' of Modernism," the author warns on the first page (vii), while
on the third he disavows interest in arguing that "this idea [about the past]
'unified' Modernism" (ix). In keeping with this reluctance, Schneidau offers
only desultory comments about why the past played such a crucial role in a
movement otherwise so enamoured of the new. At one point, defending
modernism against the charge of elitism, he urges that the modernists were
deeply driven by "an animus against snobbism," an animus that "gave powerful impetus to the belief that the present had to be atavistically invigorated
by a live, earthy past" (viii). At another point he calls attention to the waning
of the late Victorian faith in progress and evolution. As a result, he says, the
past was freed of its negative connotations; it no longer represented the
threat of dangerous regression, no longer suggested the possibility that civili289
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zation might relapse into barbarism: "in the imaginations of the Modernists,
unafflicted by melioristic fantasies of progress, atavism was rehabilitated, and
became the matrix of a new energy in art" (16). At a third point Schneidau
offers another explanation, tentatively again: "The enabling act of Modernism
may well have been the treatment of the 'chthonic' religion of Greece by the
Cambridge anthropologists, especially jane Harrison" (23). But after a summary of Harrison's views that lasts for scarcely a sentence, this notion, too, is
abandoned. Nor does Schneidau attempt to correlate these accounts or place
them within some more ambitious or coherent argument. He has, plainly, little interest in exploring the intellectual background to the modernist view of
the past, notwithstanding the suggestions raised by his title. His attention is
elsewhere, concentrated on what he terms "atavisim," or "the theme of the
reappearance or resuscitation of the past" (x), a rubric that is vague enough to
lend a semblance of unity to what is basically a collection of five essays,
mostly close readings in a New Critical vein, that treat "The Darkling
Thrush" by Hardy, Howards End by E. M. Forster, The Secret Agent by Conrad, several works by Sherwood Anderson, and the poetics of Ezra Pound.
Schneidau does advance some broader claims about the importance of his
collection. Studying the theme of atavism "illuminates some vital but obscure
relationships" in literary history, clarifying, for example, connections among
E. M. Forster, D. H. Lawrence, and F. Scott Fitzgerald. Second, it suggests
new readings of such classics as Howards End and The Secret Agent. Third, it
offers an approach to "the discomfort" that the modernists felt "with the very
idea of the 'modern.'" And fourth, it raises important questions about the
role of the past in human nature (ix-x). The more ambitious of these topics,
however, receive very little attention. The modernists' disaffection with modernity is treated only sporadically in the course of the book, while the role of
the past in human nature is dispatched in three pages (13-15) that teem with
generalities: "Humans are the only animals who, by using language, can pass
on images from the past to newer generations," and so on (13-14). Schneidau
assumes that language is fundamentally retrospective and hence always
about the past-theories of language which emphasize the performative, perlocutionary, and future-oriented aspects of language, go unmentioned-and
indeed, he pursues this assumption to its utmost consequence. For if language is truly retrospective in character, and if it can also be said to structure
consciousness and hence our perception of reality, then even our experience
of the present collapses into the past:
Consciousness seems to turn stimuli and perceptions into a running,
subverbal but latently articulate narrative, a "story" of our lives that
gives us a chance to think things over . .. consciousness is simply instant memory . ..
Perhaps. But in enlarging the past until it engulfs consciousness and the present, Schneidau succeeds only in emptying it of significance. The past becomes everything, but it also becomes nothing. It is difficult, in fact, to understand why the author troubles to include these speculations, which seem
disconnected from the rest of the book, and which often merely restate arguments made long ago by julian jaynes in The Origins of Consciousness (1976).
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If Schneidau's book consisted solely of such remarks, it would be of little
value. But its merits are very real, and they reside not in generalities about
language and consciousness, but in the minute attention that he brings to
particular texts, in the detailed observations of a critic who turns out to be a
gifted and responsive reader of the works that have caught his interest.
Because the best parts of this book are so closely tied to textual specifics, it
resists easy summarization. It may prove more useful, instead, to consider a
single essay that epitomizes some of its central concerns, such as the extended close reading of Howards End. Here Schneidau seeks to trace the
many ways that Forster uses "the motifs of the house and the land around it"
to dramatize "an ideology that we can call that of the sacred space, or autochthony, that is, the belief that spiritual powers ... inhere ... in the earth;
that they are beings, incarnate in landforms or dwellings or tombs; and they
forcefully affect even godless lives" (65). This is the most successful chapter
in the book, in no small measure because of its affectionate attention to the
novel's verbal texture and symbolic details. Schneidau, for example, swiftly
focuses on Helen Schlegel's letter at the novel's beginning, in which she describes the house called Howards End and its inhabitants, the Wilcox family.
Nearly all the features discussed by Helen reappear in subsequent chapters,
and Schneidau shows how they pattern the novel's form and layout the
mythological motifs associated with autochthony. Thus Mrs. Ruth Wilcox,
"with her hands full of the hay that was cut yesterday," becomes a
"theophany of Demeter," the hay "her cereal icon." Upon her death she also
becomes Persephone, who "disappears to emerge in renewed forms of life,"
rendering her demise "fructifying, sacrificial" (70). Her instinctive wisdom,
Schneidau summarizes, "comes from atavism" (71). Later in the novel, when
Margaret Schlegel, now the second Mrs. Wilcox, visits Howards End for the
first time after Ruth's death, it is no accident that the old housekeeper mistakes her for Ruth-for she is "clutching a bunch of weeds" recalling the earlier hay (Schneidau, p. 74). Similarly, when Margaret attends Ruth Wilcox's
funeral, she stands "far back among the women" of the village rather than
with the Wilcox family, a gesture Schneidau terms "instinctively correct" (76)
insofar as it aligns her with the country people and their supposedly more
natural, more intuitive understanding of death. The essay abounds with
shrewd observations of this sort, as when Schneidau underscores the dramatic irony in Henry Wilcox's hurried remark, "another time" (73), or when
he discusses the erotic undercurrents in the relationship between the Schlegel
sisters, particularly in the single night they spend together in Howards End
(85-86), or when he traces the novel's pattern of rest versus movement, and
how these are gendered (79-83).
Yet the chapter is not without problems, some of which appear when
Schneidau turns from Howards End to consider its interrelations with texts by
other writers. Eliot comes first. Schneidau devotes three pages (89-91) to
showing that Forster's description of London "inhaling ... exhaling her exhausted air," may have influenced Eliot's depiction of the crowd that "flowed
over London Bridge" in The Waste Land. But it is never really made dear why
this should concern us, if true, or how it alters our understanding of Eliot's
masterpiece, or how it contributes to Schneidau's arguments about autochthony and atavism. Then comes a longer treatment of F. Scott Fitzgerald's
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Gatsby (91-97), assessing Gatsby as "an Americanized Leonard Bast" (94), his
garish mansion as an analogue of Howards End, and the role of automobiles
in both books. Finally, Schneidau proceeds to compare Howards End with
Forster's other major novel, A Passage to India (97-101). The later work reveals a "harsher vision" (98), displays "fewer metaphors for the animate
earth" (99), and has, alas, "no houses of importance" (99). Though this discussion contains many insights, especially in its treatment of Fitzgerald, the
remarks trickle like drops of water from a leaky faucet, united only by their
remorseless succession. They are not steps in a coherent argument about the
themes of autochthony or atavism in modernism, but disjointed comments.
A different problem becomes apparent when Schneidau attempts to situate
Forster's treatment of myth within twentieth-century cultural history. After
noting Forster's friendships with Hardy and D. H. Lawrence, Schneidau comments: "For Forster it was thus "in the air." His . .. education in classics also
enticed him with its promise of recovering a lost world and turning it into a
merely displaced one. He may even have heard something of Jane Harrison
and the other Cambridge anthropologists, though he never manifested
firsthand knowledge. In a sense his work uncannily recapitulates Harrison's
discovery ... of chthonic, local traditions, cults, and numens of place" (68).
This, together with the reference to Harrison mentioned earlier, is all that
Schneidau has to say about this question, even though he subtitles this chapter, "Forster as Cambridge Anthropologist." It is a threadbare approach to
cultural history, and even Schneidau senses that quotation marks are needed
to contain its airiness. His claim about Harrison seems not the outcome of a
persuasive argument, but empty assertion.
Yet somewhat more than Schneidau suggests is known about the web of
relationships connecting Forster and Jane Harrison. When Forster went up to
King's College, Cambridge, in 1897, he came armed with letters of introduction to the Cambridge botanist Frank Darwin, at whose tea parties he appeared often during subsequent years. Darwin was married to Ellen Crofts,
who was Jane Harrison's best friend from her student days at Newham, and
during the period from 1898, when Harrison herself moved to Cambridge, to
Ellen's death in 1903, "Aunt Jane" was virtually a member of the Darwin
family. She would "lunch with my parents almost every Sunday in term," as
their daughter Frances later recalled (Frances Darwin, quoted in Jessie Stewart, Jane Ellen Harrison: A Portrait in Letters [London: Merlin Press, 1959],
105); and it seems only too likely that the Darwins, knowing of Forster's interest in classics and archaeology, would have mentioned Harrison's work to
him, or even have introduced him to her. And if the Darwins did not do so,
surely the Stracheys did: for Forster, as is well known, met Lytton Strachey
shortly after his arrival in Cambridge and frequented his company during the
period 1898-1904; Lytton's sister Pernel, in turn, was one of Harrison's colleagues at Newham, and their rapport was warm enough that they could
travel together to Sweden, with Lytton in tow, for six weeks in 1910. All
these relations have been chronicled by P. N. Furbank in E. M. Forster: A Life
(50,52, and 54) and Sandra Peacock in Jane Ellen Harrison (43, 45, 50, 92, 96,
108, especially 155-57, 175-76, and 218), but they are never mentioned by
Schneidau. Perhaps a record of their encounter is conserved in Forster's unpublished diaries at King's College; as Schneidau's notes show that he has
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consulted only published sources and secondary accounts, a reader feels little
confidence in his dismissal of "firsthand knowledge."
More important, Forster's interest in questions that intersect with Harrison's writings is well documented in secondary, published accounts, In 1903,
for example, Forster took an archaeological cruise to Greece that was guided
by E. A. Gardner, a journey that left him bored until the group came to Cnidus, the city in southwestern Turkey that had originally housed the famous
Demeter of Cnidus now in the British Museum; there, Forster felt, Greece
first took possession of him, possibly because the statue of Demeter was, as
his biographer notes, "already a private cult with him" (Furbank, 103-03). In
March 1904, in fact, Forster published an essay about the Cnidian Demeter in
the Independent Review, describing her as a benevolent mother-goddess who
had "transcended sex" (see Abinger Harvest, 178-90). And in his 1907 novel,
The Longest Journey, a picture of this statue figures as the only item of decoration in Stephen Wonham's attic, while the statue itself is termed one of the
"monuments of our more reticent beliefs" and is assigned a crucial role in the
work's symbolic structure (129, 153, 198, 274, 308, 210).
These materials would seem pertinent to Schneidau's claim that Mrs. Ruth
Wilcox becomes a "theophany of Demeter," or to his remarks about the treatment of sexuality in Howards End. Yet they are never mentioned. Nor is one
ever told about Harrison's discussion of Demeter in her classic Prolegomena
(1903), or about the central concepts of her work, their place in anthropology
and classical studies, or their transmission and diffusion. Oddly, though
Schneidau is often perceptive about the role of gender in Howards End, he
never mentions Harrison's view that the chthonic cults were Originally part
of an essentially matriarchal or matrilineal culture, one in which collectivity
still prevailed over individualism. And yet surely it is matriliny that we see at
work in Howards End, as the house is given by Ruth Wilcox to Margaret
Schlegel in spite of Henry Wilcox's various plans for it, and surely this interest in matriliny is inseparable from the contemporary development of feminism and its corollary, the growth of an ethos of friendship that, insofar as it
undermined marriage as a cultural ideal, had enormous implications for the
form of the novel: for whereas the classic Victorian novel typically ended in
marriage, the twentieth-century novel was faced with a question mark. That
dilemma, in Howards End, is resolved with the matrilineal collectivity of the
Schlegel sisters inheriting and possessing the house. But it is also found elsewhere in novels of the period. Consider only To the Lighthouse by Virginia
Woolf, in which the spiritual legacy of Mrs. Ramsay is transmitted to Lily
Brisco through a similar kind of matrilinear descent, and in which the crucial
difference between the two women is precisely their attitude toward the institution of marriage. This difference results in the same dilemma at the novel's close: how is the work to end, when it has already been made clear that
Lily Brisco and Augustus Carmichael will never marry, but only remain
friends? It concludes, we recall, with a kind of ersatz-marriage, the union of
the two masses in Lily's painting, which she connects after recalling the missing figure of Mrs. Ramsay. "Only connect," Forster must have mused upon
reading this. Not surprisingly, Woolf also evinced considerable interest in
Jane Harrison: as early as 1904 she took pains to be introduced to her, and in
later years she kept pace with Harrison's life and career, visiting her in Paris
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in 1923, publishing her Reminiscences of a Student's Life in 1925. Three years
later she mourned Harrison's death in one of the most moving passages in
that foundational work of modern feminism, A Room of One's Own (17). Yet
Woolf's name appears only in some incidental comments in this book, while
To the Lighthouse is never noted at all, and subjects such as the rise of feminism and the crisis of marriage are simply ignored. It is the tragedy of this
book that the richness of its close reading is matched only by the poverty of
its intellectual, cultural, and social history.
A revealing moment occurs in the final essay of this volume, as Schneidau
considers how the force of Ezra Pound's poetry and his ideas are intertwined.
To do so, he feels that he must address the question of Pound's anti-Semitism and his admiration for Mussolini:
"Why did he idealize Mussolini, and how is this reflected in the Cantos?
Pound became an admirer not because Mussolini was an anti-Semite.
On the contrary, until 1938. . Mussolini was hailed as one of the
Jews' protectors: "In 1933 American Jewish publishers selected him as
one of the world's twelve 'greatest Christian champions' of the Jews."
(If this fact seems shocking, you have more surprises in store.). (251)
Schneidau is alluding to what, after all, is common knowledge in studies of
twentieth-century history: that beyond Italy, Mussolini lent support to Zionist groups in the hope they would keep the British preoccupied in Palestine,
so furthering his own ambitions around the Mediterranean basin, while inside Italy "racialism was originally alien to Italian fascism." (See Zeev Sternhell, "The Ideology of Fascism," in Walter Laqueur, ed., Fascism: A Reader's
Guide [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976], 356; see also the classic
study by Renzo de Felice, Sioria degli ebrei ilaliani satta il fascismo [Einaudi:
Turin, 1962].) This is hardly news, much less "shocking" news. It is a commonplace of discussion about Fascism since at least 1962, and yet one senses
that for Schneidau, it really is news.
Summarizing his account of why the modernists were enchanted with fascism, Schneidau returns to the theme that unifies his volume. He writes:
we can explain much of the puzzling and embarrassing mystery of their politics by noting that Fascism was after all an atavistic convulsion, one that held
out hopes of actually materializing the past in the present" (258). But surely
this is to simplify fascism beyond all recognition, to deny its essential character as a complex and fractured reality in continuous transformation, and to
lend it an abstract coherence at the cost of deracinating it from history. To
describe the instinctive wisdom of Ruth Wilcox and the ideological aspirations of fascism with the same term, "atavism," is finally to say little of importance about either. One must erase so many layers of cultural, institutional, and ideological mediation that what remains is little more than a
phantom. That is the specter that haunts this book at every point where it
strays beyond the borders of the text, conceived in essentially New Critical
terms.
As the owners of dogs are sometimes said to resemble their pets, so it is
that books sometimes come to resemble their subjects. An uncharitable critic
might complain that something like this has happened to Schneidau's work,
ft • • •
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that he has meditated upon atavism for so long that his work has come to
embody it-has become a living specimen of an approach to cultural stud\'
that, mercifully, has all but disappeared. But that would be unfair. This book.
offers many valuable insights into the specific works that Schneidau has chosen to examine, with close readings that are supple, suggestive, and keenly
discriminating. It is when it seeks to probe the implications of these readings
for our understanding of modernism that a reader is likely to feel disappointed.

Yale University

Lawrence Rainey

Baudrillard: Critical and Fatal Theory by Mike Gane. London and New York:
Routledge, 1991. Pp. 243. $49.95, cloth; $16.95, paper.
If ever the work of a theorist has undergone, and suffered from, the effects
of extensive critical hype, it is that of Jean Baudrillard. Mike Gane's study is
therefore a welcome effort to reduce such hype by bringing the details and
development of this author's project into clear perspective. Gane's title suggests this development, i.e. the movement in Baudrillard's writing from one
paradigm to another. From critical theory based on Marx, semiology and sociology (e.g. works of the 1968-72 period such as For a Critique of the Politi·
cal Economy of HIe Sigl1 among others), Baudrillard moved through the
"crucial juncture" of rejecting much of Marxist theory in favor of the subsequent development of "fatal theory." This new perspective is based, says
Gane, on the "Durkheimian paradigm" in which Baudrillard places himself
"as a primitive, as a pre- or anti-rationalist, [in order] to evolve a poetic theoretical analysis of the effects of the most advanced technical transformations
in our culture" (5). Gane's own analytical approach consists, first, of situating
this project's development , .... ithin its socio-cultural and critical contexts (t\\'O
of Part l's three chapters), then of tracing the phases of Baudrillard·s develop·
ment toward "fatal theory" (seven chapters in Parts II and III), and finally
(chapter 11) of providing a synthetic and critical overview of Baudrillard's
strategies.
Gane clearly states his overall goal: to provide a practice of reading and
writing that can encompass Baudrillard's own such practices, i.e. his "double
project" or "doubling up of the repertoires of criticism: one based on a radic<11
aiteritv to the modern svstem, the other based on radic<11 difference \\'ithin
the s);stem~ (12). For Cane seeks a path other than a "producti\'ist~ style of
rCJding, one that cJ.n show that "to read Baudrillard is to begin to question
the effectiveness of a purely political reading, or the reading of the s:,'mpt(l'
matic t)'pe, or indeed of the reading \\'hich assumes the homogenenLJ~ subjcct
Jnd the homogeneous text JS if the project was under the control of a singlt,
thought or unified process of decision mJking~ (13). Yet, CanL' doC'..; hnd ',l
cnhL'rcnt Jnd stable franw\\'ork" in B<1udril1ard's ~adherL'nc(' tn thl'
of the symbolic cultures and the ine\'itabk frailty and \'ull1erabili:y
tiers o{ silllulatil)n tnund in the \\'l~~t- (14). it is on the "l'rit'~ 0: (\\n:r,l ... t~ i-··."
\\\'l'CI1 tlwsc t\\'o irrc«.11Ki\,lHc ordl'r..- that G,lill' lL'OJ'-L'.'- l~.\' t'\<lrninlnl: htl',,,
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in Baudrillard's work, this "basic contradiction is reproduced" and by situating "an analysis of the first phases of simulation with the attempt to criticise
it poetically," in other words, the movement "from critical to fatal theory"

(14).
Upon careful perusal of this book, one can locate three major concerns to
which Gane devotes his efforts. The first is the rather laborious task of following Baudrillard's development from the early, semiotic-Marxist "critical"
period, through the transitional phase of critique and into the more recent
manifestations of "fatal theory." This concern occupies the bulk of Gane's
study, i.e. sections II and III that provide an extremely important, but nonetheless dense review of Baudrillard's work. What renders Gane's study so
valuable is his careful attention, on one hand, to Baudrillard's situation
within the shifting socio-cultural context of French (Parisian) intelligentsia
and, on the other hand, to Baudrillard's complete works, including those not
(or partially) translated as well as interviews. Thus, Gane helps the reader
follow Baudrillard's reflections on and growing resistance to Marxist and
Saussurean positions (chapters 4 & 5), and then in "Baudrillard: theoretical
critic" (chapter 6), Gane examines Baudrillard's mid-1970s critique of structural Marxism (notably in the 1973 The Mirror of Production [1975
translation]), psychoanalysis (L'Echange symbolique et 10 mort [1976]), and
Foucault (the 1977 Oublier Foucault [1987 translation]). In each case, Baudrillard turns toward a new position, respectively, utopianism (versus Marxism's
"alienation," 114-115), the poetic and the symbolic order (versus psychoanalysis and Saussurean linguistics, 116-119) and simulacrum and the "death of
the social" (versus Foucault's conception of power, 120-125).
Resulting from this "period of critique" is the flowering of Baudrillard's
new positions in the 1980s: his emphasis on "a black imagery of the mass as
the centre of gravity of the society," insisting on society's movement toward
"inward implosion" (129-130); a distinct change of style of writing, based on
Baudrillard's contention that "the poetic ... is the most radical threat to the
current and conventional understanding of language and expression" (130);
and a change of strategy, "to attack the present order not only from the past,
and from the continuing theme of the symbolic order, but from within its
mass logic" (131). These shifts result formally, says Gane, in "a nostalgic
modernism [a la Mallarme] rather than some kind of futuristic effervescent
postmodernism" and in "the initiation of a style of (anti-)sociology as prosepoetry, fiction theory [that] became, immediately, avant-gardist, in a field increasingly dominated by technocratic modes of analysis" (131-132). Closely
tracing the shifts in Baudrillard's writings, Cane renders a notable service not
only in defining (to the extent possible) this "strategy of the mass" (a
"symbolic force of ambivalence ... [that] neutralises semiological positivity,"
while being '''neither subject nor object''' 140), but also of showing the strategy's slippages and inconsistencies that, in fact, seem necessary given Baudrillard's complex assertions. As Gane concludes chapter 7, "The inward implosion of meaning in the masses, therefore, is a popular negative fascism in
a sense-one drained of drive and energy, become melancholic. Cool fascism
seems a contradictory concept, but we are not far from it" (142).
Gane pursues the same approach, close reading from within Baudrillard's
"fatal logic" linked to critical commentary, in three successive chapters (8, 9,
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10) devoted, respectively, to De la Seduction (1979; 1990 translation), Les
Strategies fatales (1983; Fatal Strategies, untranslated), and Baudrillard's discovery of "'the finished form of the future catastrophe'" described in the
much commented Amerique (1986, 1988 translation). At this point, I need to
address Gane's second and third concerns that, while not necessarily linked,
nonetheless become so as his study progresses. The second concern is to provide precise, synthetic commentary on Baudrillard's positions, admirable ex-

amples of which occur early on in the contextual chapters (2 & 3) that follow
the introduction. These provide the reader with valuable insight regarding,
first, Baudrillard's debt to post-World War II thinkers and critical debates
and, second, his stance vis-a.-vis contemporary discussions of postmodernism, Marxism and feminism. In both areas, Gane argues that readers, and
Anglophone readers in particular (Le. those with access only to selected
translations), have failed to comprehend fully Baudrillard's complex development, and these chapters are in themselves exceptional contributions for understanding this writer. Similarly, the final chapter, uThe double spiral,'
draws on the detailed, chronological studies that precede it in order to provide a nuanced, critical and nonetheless appreciative commentary regarding
the constitutive contradictions and difficulties in Baudrillard's project.
However, linked to this second, synthetic concern throughout the book is a
third in which Gane assumes an authoritative stance as justicier, as self-appointed lawman staging, as it were, a shoot-out at the po-rno corral. On one
hand, Gane is genuinely informative and convincing in his explanation of the
definite critical misprision regarding Baudrillard's attitude toward postmodemism since, IIfar from embracing postmodernisffi, Baudrillard's whole effort
is to combat it" (55). Thus, Gane can scrutinize critiques by various writers,
notably Alex Callinicos, Arthur Kroker, Fredric Jameson and Douglas Kellner,
in the light of Baudrillard's own positions and statements, however shifting
and paradoxical these may be. On the other hand, Gane's unyielding dismissal of Kellner's critique of Baudrillard, indeed his excoriation in a beefy
footnote (222-223) of one particular argument of Kellner's, left this reader
rather uneasy. For, to devote so much space throughout this study to refuting
the work of one critic-not only is uThe Marxist Debate" (chapter 2) really
the Kroker-Kellner-Gane differend, the opening section of chapter 10 treats
uThe Problem of Kellner's Reading of America"-tries the reader's patience
and finally detracts from Gane's otherwise insightful analyses and commentaries.
Moreover, at one point in his introduction, Gane resorts to the prescriptive
mode to insist on the propriety of reading BaudriIlard, whose Uproject must
be regarded as an assault on the 'disenchanted' world from the point of view
of a militant of the symbolic (enchanted but cruel) cultures .... BaudriIlard is
a cruel, theoretical extremist, and must be read accordinglyU (7, my emphasis). Given the many lapses in Baudrillard scholarship and commentary that
Gane documents, one can sympathize with his efforts to orient forcefully future readings of Baudrillard, based on his own. But these are, indeed, Gane's
own readings, and the reader must not necessarily read in his fashion (although Gane often provides strong arguments for doing so). Thus, although
the density of the central chapters at times requires unflagging commitment
on the reader's part, Gane's approach is remarkably and consistently in-
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formed and, despite his momentary insistence on a "proper" reading, he does
not hesitate to nuance appreciative commentary with trenchant criticism that
provides important inflections and clarifications for a complex body of work.

Wayne State University
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